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ABSTRACT
INITIAL AND LONG-TERM PRICE PERFORMANCE OF 
INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS:
TURKISH EXPERIENCE 1990-1993
Z. NUŞİN YAVUZ
M.B.A. Thesis
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Ayşe Yüce
The purpose of this study is to examine both the initial and medium-long term price 
performance of initial public offerings in Istanbul Stock Exchange during the continuous 
1990-1993 period.
In the light of the findings, initial public offerings are found to be underpriced meaning 
that investors in initial public offering market can exercise significant short-term returns 
relative to the market. In addition, in the whole period, the effect of this initial 
underpricing continues up to the second month. However, when we look at the long-term 
results, it is seen that IPOs underperformed the market although the results are not 
significant. As a result, investors in the IPO merket can exercise initial abnormal returns 
but in the long-run they produce a negative return although not significant.
ÖZET
HALKA AÇILAN ŞİRKETLERİN KISA VE UZUN DÖNEM 
FİYAT PERFORMANSLARI:
TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ 1990-1993
Z. NUŞİN YAVUZ
M.B.A. Tezi
Tez Yöneticisi: Yardımcı Doç. Dr. Ayşe Yüce
Bu çalışmanın amacı İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler Borsasında 1990-1993 döneminde halka 
arz edilen hisse senetlerinin kısa ve uzun dönemli fiyat performanslarını incelemektir.
Bulunan verilerin ışığında, halka arz edilen senetlerin düşük fıyatlandırıldığı bulunmuş, 
ve böylece halka arz edilen senetlere yatırım yapanların kısa dönemde piyasa karşısında 
belirgin bir getiri sağladıkları saptanmıştır. Bununla birlikte, bütün dönemde düşük 
fiyatlandırma etkisi ikinci aya kadar sürmektedir. Ancak, uzun dönem sonuçlarına 
baktığımızda, halka arz edilen hisse senetlerinin piyasanın altında bir getiri yaptığı 
saptanmış ama bu getiri belirgin olmamıştır. Sonuç olarak, halka arz edilen hisse 
senetlerine yatırım yapan yatırımcılar, kısa dönemde anormal pozitif getiri sağlarken, 
uzun vadede kötü bir performansla karşılaşmaktadır.
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A linking mechanism between the users and the providers of capital are exercised 
through capital markets. Financial intermediaries bring together the surplus savers who 
have excess funds, with the deficit units in the economy who are in need of funds; by this 
way issuers are able to raise capital and investors are able to place their capital, in the 
most efficient way for both parties. This is provided by the primary market.
Public offerings of debt and equity constitute the primary market. Public offerings are 
made mainly of two reasons: 1) Providing direct capital to the company as a way of 
financing, and 2) Acquiring new shareholders and hence, broadening the number of 
shareholders with the desire to be known widespread. Some of the other reasons are: to 
allow original owner to convert his equity in the company to cash; to facilitate future 
funding by means of subsequent equity offerings and tax advantages.
The performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) is the main concern in this study and it 
is believed that a clear understanding of IPO market is important for investors, firms and 
also for undei-writers. The performance of IPOs is important for investors, as the major 
problem of the small investor is said to be the accessibility for the favorable new issues 
because of the asymmetry in information between informed and uninformed investors. 
Financial managers should also observe the IPO market for their evaluation of financial 
alternatives.
1. INTRODUCTION
Similarly, firms planning to go public should be closely interested in the pricing because 
a downward pricing bias of the new issue introduces a loss of funds for the firm. Pricing 
is one of the most important and perhaps the most difficult decision in an IPO. The price
should not be too low; the issuer firm will not get the advantage of the offering as the 
issue will be sold at discount and this would be unnecessarily costly to the issuer. The 
price also should not be too high; investors will not be willing to purchase the new issue 
readily and this might cause losses for the underwriters.
Underwriting a new issue is important for the incurred costs and risks of the underwriter. 
It is widely claimed that underwriters may attempt to 'underprice' new issues of common 
stock so that the initial public offerings will be fully subscribed and a rise in price 
subsequent to issue is observed. This may cause a good reputation on behalf of the 
underwriter. The theory of efficient markets suggests that the price of the newly issued 
stock will quickly adjust to reflect relevant information. To the extent that underpricing 
exists, the difference between offering price and subsequent market price constitutes an 
amount (initial rate of return) that is distributed by the underwriter to initial purchasers of 
the stock that is significantly positive in this period.
As soon as the IPOs are started trading in the market, a large amount of information 
about the new issues will be released. Furthermore, as new information becomes 
available, price of the shares that have already been listed in the market may change. 
According to the efficient markets theory, market will adjust the prices of new shares to 
reflect all available information when there are enough discerning traders in the market. 
As a result, pricing errors will be random and no arbitrage opportunity from certain 
trading rules can be derived. If however, any inefficiencies in the secondary market exist, 
investors can find ways to profit from the situation.
There are numerous studies that examine the performance of IPOs in the U.S. and in 
some other countries. They report the existence of positive average initial returns. 
Although there is considerable debate on the underlying rationale of such returns, in the
literature, it is mostly concluded that the presence of positive average initial returns 
constitutes evidence of deliberate underpricing. On the other hand, some evidence on the 
U.S., the U.K., Germany, Australia, Latin America and others suggest that what appears 
to be underpricing in short run may be overpricing in the long run, and agree on the point 
that IPOs' long run after-market performance is negative. These studies make the 
efficiency of IPO market in doubt.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the price behavior of IPOs issued between 
1990-1993 and traded in the ISE, over one year period after they are listed. Both the 
short-run and long-run price performances will be investigated throughout the study. 
This will provide information on the efficiency of Turkish IPO market both in the short 
and the long run and we will find out if opportunities for superior profits exist. The price 
performance results will not only tell us about the efficiency of the Turkish IPO market 
but also help for comparison with the initial and the long-run performance studies done 
throughout the world. As Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) is gaining interest in the last 
few years and there is an increasing tendency for the firms to go public, the study will try 
to shed light on the present situation of IPO market.
The long-run performance of Initial Public Offerings is important for several reasons. As 
Ritter (1991) emphasizes: first, from the investor's point of view, the existence of price 
patterns may present opportunities for active trading strategies to produce superior 
returns. Second, a non zero aftermarket performance questions the informational 
efficiency of the IPO market. Third, the volume of IPOs showing large variations over 
time may indicate that issuers are timing new issues to take advantage of opportunities. 
Fourth, cost of external equity capital for companies going public depends not only upon 
the transaction costs incurred in going public but also upon the returns that investors 
receive in the aftermarket.
An initial public offering is the first effort by firms to raise capital in a public equity 
market. When companies go public, the intention is particularly to raise new capital for 
the company. But also there can be such circumstances where all the shares on offer arc 
being sold by existing shareholders. In fact some of the biggest initial public offerings 
occur when governments sell off their share-holdings in companies as privatization 
programs which was the situation in Turkey in 1990 and 1991.
Before the establishment of Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE), Turkish firms had very few 
alternatives other than bank loans to provide capital for the firm. After ISE began 
operations in 1985, equity finance became a bright alternative of raising equity. As the 
liquidity of ISE increased (Table 1), initial public offerings became a popular way of 
financing and showed a high performance since 1990. This allowed firms to raise capital 
in more favorable conditions .
2. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
Table 1. Common Stock Issues in the Primary Market
Year # of IPOs Nominal Value (million $) Market Value (million .1))
1990 35 357.40 812.23
1991 24 ; 448.06 551.99
1992 13 438.36 487.14
1993 16 494.58 568.87
1994 25 804.88 1,009.98
1995 29 610.06 734.93
Source: Capital Markets Board (12/1995), p.4.
The regulation of the primary and secondaiy markets in Turkey are established by The 
Capital Markets Law, enacted in 1981, which at the same time indicates the 
characteristics of financial instruments and the principals which the financial institutions 
have to practice. All firms that go public are under the supervision of The Capital Market 
Board (CMB), which supervises and regulates the capital markets.
According to Capital Markets Law, there are procedural requirements for every firm that 
wants to go public. The firms can either issue new shares as a direct issue or as an 
indirect issue by making use of an underwriter's service. Usually, underwriters act as 
financial intermediaries to a new issue. They first provide the company with procedural 
and financial advice, handle the administrative tasks, then underwrite the issue and 
finally resell and distribute it to the public. If the issuer and investment banker agree to 
proceed with a primary issue, experts give their assessments of the situation and 
investment banking firm arranges a tentative underwriting agreement with the issuer. The 
agreement specifies all terms of the issue except the price for the new issue.
The originator or lead underwriter, that is the investment banker which first agrees with 
the issuer, coordinates two groups: underwriting syndicate and the selling group, to 
handle the underwriting and distribution of the primary issue. Underwriting syndicate 
consist of some other investment bankers or brokerage firms which share the 
underwriting risk. The selling group is made up of some banks and brokerage firms that 
agree to sell the primary offering to investors.
2.1 Procedures
The CMB requires primary issues be accompanied by a registration statement which is a 
detailed document that presents information about the proposed financing, the firm's
history, existing business, and detailed balance sheet and income statement for three 
preceding years. After the CMB analyzes the registration and decides that the firm 
provides all the information required by the capital market law, it gets an approval. The 
CMB may delay approval by requesting additional information . After the approval has 
been taken and p^ce has been set, the prospectus, a portion of the registration
statement, whicj.^  disclose all relevant facts that a potential investor needs to evaluate the 
new offering, jg reproduced in quantity and delivered to potential investors. The 
prospectus incl^ ^^ gg information on the issuer's products, history and location, names and 
addresses of issuer’s officers and directors and the underwriters, detailed balance 
sheet and incOj^g statement for three preceding years and the offering price of the issue. 
Circular is puljjjg]^g  ^ official gazette to announce that the shares of the firm will be
sold. Through period underwriter and the firm make advertisements to sell the issues 
that are offen.^^^p^^^ig
2.2 Underwriting Contracts
There are tv.'O forms of underwriting contracts that are commonly used in IPOs. The first
one is the 'f rm commitment' where underwriter agrees to purchase the whole issue from
the firm at 
where unde
a specified price for resale to the public. The second one is the 'best efforts'
rwriter acts only as a marketing agent of the firm. Underwriter acts only as an
intermediai
y to sell the security to the public for a predetermined spread without carrying
any risk of ^
failure.
Sales of IPOs can be made either at the stock exchange or by book building. The first 
transaction is made at the offer price and the margin is set at 5% for the first five trading 
days in sales at the stock exchange. For the next five days the margin stays at 5% and 
only the intermediary can quote bid order. In book building, offers are collected within 
the sales period and distribution of shares are made according to a fair scheme 
(Oztop,1996).
IPOs can be made through three basic methods by book building. Underwriters can make 
offers for sale at a fixed price, or tender, or a placement. In the fixed price offer, the 
issuing bank or intermediary fixes the price of the issue before dealings in the issue 
begin. Once the price is fixed, it can be neither modified in case of a changing demand 
for the new issues, nor withdrawn. While the applications for a specific number of shares 
are invited from the public, the issue is sub-underwritten by a group of financial 
institutions at the same fixed price. If there is excess demand, the issuer has to allocate 
the shares according to a fair system.
2.3 Sales Methods
In tender offers, a minimum price limit is specified and applicants are expected to state 
the price (at or above the minimum price) and the number of shares they wish to 
subscribe. After the applications have been received, a strike price is set below which the 
applications are rejected. If the strike price is set below the market clearing price then a 
system of rationing is required.
In a placement, shares are not made publicly available but instead are sold directly to a 
group of investors who are usually large institutions. The price of the issue is fixed 
before shares start trading.
2.4 Cost of Issue
There are two components of the cost of an initial public offering: first one is the direct 
cost of employing the services of the underwriters, advisors, accountants, and the 
administrative expenses such as payment of taxes, fees for registering the new securities, 
printing and mailing costs; the second cost is the hidden cost of underpricing of the new 
issue. When the offering price is set lower than the true value of the issue, investors who 
buy the issue get a bargain at the expense of the firm's original stockholders. Whenever 
any company goes public, it is difficult for the underwriter to judge how much investors 
will be willing to pay the settled price for the new issue so the underwriter tries to 
underprice the issue to lower its exposure to risk. A number of researchers have tried to 
measure the extent of underpricing. The studies done throughout the world about the 
underpricing phenomenon are discussed in the next section.
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3. LITERATURE SURVEY
Many studies examined the price performance of initial public offerings and the rationale 
behind the underpricing puzzle. They have used different methods of computation and 
set different hypothesis for the reason of underpricing phenomenon. In general, 
explanations of underpricing can be examined in two main groups: The first group tries 
to identify market imperfections. They argue that underpricing should disappear (at least 
partially) by eliminating or reducing them. The second group considers underpricing as 
an equilibrium situation and tries to propose theoretically valid explanations for the 
persistence underpricing. Kunz and Aggarwal (1994), present a brief review of theories 
that have been suggested to explain underpricing of IPOs.
3.1 Hypotheses on Underpricing of IPOs
A. Institutional Lag Hypothesis
The underpricing of IPOs could be attributed to rising stock markets between the fixing 
of the offering price and the price at the first trading day
B. Risk Averse Investment Bankers Hypothesis
Since the investment bank in its function as an underwriter is interested in selling all the 
stock in order not to lose money, it will prefer a low issue price to keep that risk as low 
as possible. There is no doubt that investment banks are risk averse, but the argument is 
not very satisfactory because it does not explain why the issuers do not force investment 
bank to set a higher issue price. Three different possibilities that may explain this are: 
monopoly power of investment banks, investment banks' having better information, the 
issuers' advantage expectations from underpricing.
C. Monopoly-Power Hypothesis
The monopoly power hypothesis assumes that lack of competition among investment 
banks gives them a strong position to negotiate with the issuer who has to depend on 
them. One reason might be the fact that for the issuer, going public is a one time process. 
The investment bank, on the other hand, has more experience and also has important 
contacts with its clients. Because of its reputation, it can impose relatively unattractive 
conditions for the issuer. Following Ritter (1984), this monopsonic power would 
especially harm small, less known companies that tend to be more speculative. According 
to this argument, investment bankers can directly profit by setting the issue price too low: 
they can give these ‘gifts’ to their best clients and keep or strengthen the relationship 
with them. The investment bank would then earn more money on other activities. By 
definition monopoly power hypothesis is defensible only if there is not enough 
competition among various investment banks. Otherwise, the issuer could simply select 
the one that offers the highest net price and the best services. The banks then try to out 
bid each other in order to get the underwriter commissions.
D. Lack of Experience
Another explanation for underpricing is inexperience of the involved parties in an IPO. 
The issue price can be set very conservatively in order to sell the entire issue. High initial 
returns in the secondary market would therefore tend to be built into the offer price.
E. Asymmetric Information Hypothesis
Baron (1982) focuses on the asymmetry of information between the issuing firm and the 
investment banker. He hypothesizes that the investment banker is better informed about 
the market demand for the firm's securities than the firm and that underpricing is due to 
the fact that the investment banker is better informed about capital markets than the
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issuer. Further, he argues that the reputation of the investment bank indicates quality of 
an IPO and can therefore generate more demand for new stocks. Although the issuer can 
only incompletely monitor the services provided by the investment bank, using the 
seivices of the investment bank is still better than attempting to bring the issue to the 
market itself Since the firm must compensate the investment banker for providing advice 
in setting the offer price for the issue and for marketing securities, the optimal offer price 
is a decreasing function of the uncertainty about the market demand for the issue, while 
the value of delegation to the underwriter is an increasing function of uncertainty. In the 
model, the investment bank can therefore to some extent profit from its information 
advantage by setting the issue price too low.
Other authors focus on the asymmetry in information between informed and uninformed 
potential investors. Rock (1986) assumes that markets are efficient in the way that the 
marginal investment in information yields a normal expected return. Potential investors 
can be divided mainly into two groups: First group is the investors who are better 
informed and thus earn abnormal returns. Second is the group of investors who rationally 
choose not to invest in information. In an offering, there is uncertainty about the market 
clearing price. If the offer price of the new issue is overpriced, only uninformed investors 
will submit purchase orders. Consequently, uninformed customers will be subscribed to 
the issues that trade at a discount in the aftermarket. If an issue is underpriced, informed 
investors will also submit bids and the issue is rationed. Hence, uninformed investors 
systematically receive more of overpriced issues and less of underpriced issues. They 
face a winner's curse: if an uninformed investor is allocated shares in an IPO, there is a 
greater than usual chance that the offering will start trading at a discount. In order to 
keep them as customers in the IPO market, average issue price has to be set low enough 
to compensate their losses caused by overpriced stocks. In equilibrium, the uninformed
n
investors get a risk adjusted normal return on their capital, while the informed investors 
get excess returns that just compensate their efforts to obtain an information advantage.
In Rock's model, the degree of underpricing is related to the ex ante uncertainty about the 
value of the issue. The greater the ex ante uncertainty, the greater is the number of 
investors who choose to become informed and so the greater is the winner's curse faced 
by the uninformed. Rock's model implies that riskier firms should have higher average 
initial returns than firms that are easier to evaluate.
Ritter (1984) supposes that high-risk IPOs are underpriced more than low risk offerings. 
Uhlir (1989) takes the .standard deviations of the daily stock price returns during the first 
20 trading days to measure the uncertainty of an IPO. His regression with underpricing 
(dependent variable) and standard deviation (independent variable) leads to a highly 
significant results. Beatty and Ritter (1986), test two prepositions: first preposition is 
"The greater is the ex ante uncertainty about the value of an issue, the greater is the 
expected underpricing". This is supported by empirical evidence and they conclude that 
an issuing firm has an incentive to reduce this uncertainty by voluntarily disclosing 
information. The second preposition is that "Underwriters whose offerings have average 
initial returns that are not balanced with their ex ante uncertainty lose subsequent market 
share". They argue that there is an equilibrium amount of underpricing. If an investment 
banker underprices the issue too much, given the characteristics of the issue, the 
investment banker loses future offerings. If the investment banker underprices too little, 
he loses investors. They examine the average deviation of 49 investment bankers during 
the period 1977-1981 and compare subsequent performance of the 24 underwriters whose 
average deviation from their estimated normal underpricing is greatest with that of the 
remaining 25 underwriters whose average deviation is least. For the 24 with greatest 
deviation, their market share goes from 46.6 to 24.5 percent and five of the 24 terminate
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the operations during 1981-1982. The market share of the 25 with the smallest deviation 
goes from 27.2 to 21.0 percent and only one of the 25 terminates the operation. These 
results further suggest that, there may be other factors in the market, since market share 
of all parties have fallen.
F. Information Cascades Hypothesis
This hypothesis state that potential investors pay attention also to other investors as well 
as their own information about a new issue. If an investor sees that no one else wants to 
buy the new issue, he may decide not to buy even when he has favorable information. 
Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994) say that, an issuer may want to underprice an issue 
to induce the first few potential investors to buy and thereby set off a cascade in which 
all subsequent investors want to buy irrespective of their private information.
G. Speculative Bubble Hypothesis
When the fixed price offer cannot serve as a successful allocation for the new issues, the 
'hot issues' which are characterized by a demand that largely exceeds the disposable 
supply of securities take place. As a result, investors who could not get enough securities 
in the primary market will buy them in the secondary market. Even though the offering 
prices of the issues are consistent with their underlying economic values, the speculation 
in the aftermarket push the prices above their real worth temporarily. The bubble would 
burst some time later and initial positive excess retmns of the IPO should be followed by 
negative excess returns in a short period of time.
Uhlir (1989) examines the performance of German IPOs for one year after the offer and 
finds a continuos underperformance between 10th and 12th months, but could not 
observe a sharp price drop. Ritter (1991) also detects a continuos underperfomance of
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IPOs in the US for a period up to three years and the returns come out to be even 
negative although he includes the large initial returns of the first trading day.
H. Protection Against Legal Pursuit
Ibbotson (1975) and Tinic (1988) suggest that the issuing firms may underprice their 
IPOs to reduce their vulnerability to lawsuits. As there is a large uncertainty in the IPO 
market about the relevant information, wrong or incomplete information can lead to large 
loses.
To test this hypothesis, Tinic (1988) compares IPOs before and after introduction of the 
Securities Act in 1933. His sample of IPOs between 1923 and 1930 shows lower 
underpricing than those between 1966 and 1971, confirming the hypothesis. The 
shortcoming of the study was the lag between the time periods compared because not 
only the legal situation but probably many other factors might have been changed, that is 
why the findings has to be interpreted with caution.
Ibbotson (1975) finds a possible explanation for the underpricing that the issuer and the 
investment bank agree on protecting themselves against legal pursuits by setting the issue 
price low enough to avoid losses to investors. The underpricing could then be interpreted 
as an insurance premium. But there is no empirical evidence in his study.
I. Advantages for the Issuer
According to Ibbotson (1975), underpriced new issues ‘leave good taste in investors’ 
mouths’ so that the future underwritings from the same issuer could be sold at attractive 
prices although this is in contradiction to an efficient market. It is pointed out that there 
is no reason why investors who got a good ‘gift’ in the past, are ready to accept a price 
above the market price for a future security offering of the same issuer.
14
Another argument is that the issuers could invest in their reputation by intentionally 
underpricing their IPO. Keeley (1986) proposes that ‘an oversubscribed issue may carry 
a certain aura of success, and may even be regarded as a good marketing exercise’. In 
theory, this hypothesis can explain underpricing to the extent that the same amount of 
money would have been spent for public relations or advertising to reach a certain aim of 
the issuer. Kunz and Aggarwal (1994) state that it would be wrong to deny the influence 
of the reputation hypothesis on underpricing adding that it is however hardly possible to 
quantify it.
Most of these hypothesis depend on some empirical findings that investigate the 
performance of IPO market both in short and long-terms. In this study, short-term and 
long-term results of international evidence will be discussed in separate headings in order 
to progress in a systematic way.
3.2 Empirical Studies
3.2.1 Short-Term
Many studies suggest that initial public offerings of common stocks are priced at a 
discount to their subsequent trading price. Earlier studies on IPOs were done by 
researchers such as McDonald and Fisher (1972), Ibbotson (1975), Reilly (1977), Logiie 
(1973), Neuberger and Hammond (1974), and Block and Stanley (1980). Strong 
evidence in these studies presented the occurrence of a premium associated with the 
initial offering of new common stock, followed by normal market performance.
McDonald and Fisher (1972) reported significantly large returns in the first week 
following the offering with data on 142 new issues in the first quarter of 1969. Logue
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(1973), found a 41.7% performance over one month period for the sample of 250 IPOs 
issued between 1965 and 1969. Neuberger and Hammond (1974), in their sample of 816 
issues between 1965 and 1969 found 17.1% return in one week from the offer date. 
McDonald and Jacquillat (1974), studied 31 French new issues for 1968-1971. Mean 
offering price came out to be only slightly below mean market price in early trading, 
resulting in a mean market adjusted return of 3% in the first trading day. They concluded 
that initial price adjustment was rapid in terms of available information and that their 
results were consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. Ibbotson (1975), reported 
average underpricing of 11.4% in the first month with a t-statistic of 3.48 for the newly 
issued common stocks which were offered to public during the period 1960 through 
1969. Block and Stanley (1980), in their study of 102 IPOs between 1974 and 1978, 
found an average underpricing of 5.96% which is significant at 0.01 level of significance. 
Neuberger and La Chapelle (1983), examined the price performance of 118 new issues 
between 1975 and 1980 and found an underpricing of 27.7% one week after the offering.
Ritter (1984) analyzed the 'hot issue' market of 1980, the 15 month period from .lanuary 
1980 to March 1981, during which the average initial return on unseasoned new issues of 
common stock was 48.4%. This was in contrast to an average return of 16.3% during the 
'cold issue' market comprising the rest of the 1977-1982 period. An equilibrium 
explanation for this difference is investigated by Ritter, but is found to be insufficient. 
Instead, this 'hot issue' market is found to be associated almost exclusively with natural 
resource issues. For firms in other industries, a 'hot issue' market was hardly apparent. 
Lately, Ritter in 1991, measured an average first day initial return of 14.32% for a 
sample of 1526 IPOs during the period 1975-1984. Also, Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter 
(1988) observed an average underpricing of 16.4% in the period 1960-1987. Miller and 
Reilly (1987), examined the mispricing of 510 IPOs with respect to daily returns, daily 
volume and bid-ask spreads, from the offering date to the fifth and twenty-first trading
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days following the offering. The average net return of 9.87% was found to be significant 
at the 0.01 level. The results indicated that the market adjusts to any mispricing during 
the first day of public trading, and the excess returns are not available to investors in the 
aftermarket. Similarly, the results of Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), indicate that if an 
investor had purchased each IPO at the offering date and price and held the investments 
for 1 day, the rate of return earned would be 10.67% higher than the return of NASDAQ 
index in the same time. According to Aggarwal and Rivoli, there are two possible 
explanations for the abnormal returns in the IPO market: 1) IPOs are underpriced at the 
initial offering, or 2) IPOs are temporarily overvalued by investors in early trading. They 
state that abnormal returns can be interpreted as evidence of underpricing only if it is 
shown or assumed that aftermarket for IPOs is efficient. Consequently, they claim that 
IPOs are underpriced more than their intrinsic values in early aftermarket trading due to 
overvaluations and fads, given their finding of abnormal initial returns and negative 
market adjusted long-term returns.
Underpricing of IPOs are also very significant in several markets other than U.S. 
.Tapanese market showed an initial underpricing of 51.9% for 106 IPOs during the period 
1979-1984 documented by Dawson and Pliraki (1985). In Canada, Jog and Riding 
(1987), found the average underpricing as 11% in the first day of trading from the 
issuance. Moreover, it is stated that the underpricing is related to 3 variables, trading 
volume, business sector of the firm and the use to which funds from the offerings were 
put. Finn and Higham (1988), studied the joint process of initial-issue-cum-listing for 93 
Australian issues on the Sydney Stock Exchange during the period 1966-1978. The 
average initial market-adjusted return was 29.2% with a t-statistic of 7.80. In Germany, 
the level of underpricing reported by Uhlir (1989) was 21.5% whereas it was only 5.1% 
in the Netherlands as reported by Wessels (1989). Jenkinson and Mayer (1988), further 
examined the extent of underpricing for 11 French issues during 1986-1987 and 20 U.K.
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issues involved in privatization programs during 1979-1987. The average discount on the 
first day's closing market price relative to the offer price was 25.05% for French tender 
offers, 32.79% for 14 U.K. fixed price offers, and only 2.5% for 6 U.K. tender offers 
producing an average discount of 22.2% for all U.K. privatizations. In another study of 
U.K. market, Levis (1993), reported average first day returns of 14.3% for 712 IPOs 
between 1980 and 1988. In Switzerland, Kunz and Aggarwal (1994) documented that for 
a sample of 42 stocks that were issued in the market between 1983 and 1989, a 35.8% 
average initial first day return is found.
Similar short-run performances were documented for the developing markets. Dawson 
(1987), examined the IPOs in Malaysia, Hong Kong and Singapore. Malaysia showed the 
most severe underpricing about 167% for a sample of 21 IPOs in the years 1978-1983. 
The average underpricing in Hong Kong was 13.8% for 21 IPOs and 39.4% for 39 IPOs 
in Singapore. Dawson states that new issues in Malaysia, Hong Kong and Singapore are 
small in number, heavily oversubscribed, and characterized by extensive information 
becoming available about the issuer. Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez (1993), examined 
three Latin American markets and documented the existence of positive average initial 
returns of 78.5%, 16.3%, 2.8% for Brazilian, Chilean and Mexican IPOs respectively. It 
is obviously documented that there exist positive average initial returns in the U.S. and 
other countries. However, recent evidence suggests that in the U.S. what appears to be 
underpricing in short-run may be overpricing when one considers long-run performances 
of IPOs.
There is not many studies on Istanbul Stock Exchange which examine the price 
performance of Turkish IPOs. However, Oztop (1996), examines the short and medium- 
term performances during 1994 and 1995. The average market adjusted retuin of 45 IPOs 
in 1994 and 1995 on the first day after the issue is reported as 5.37% with a standard
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deviation of 12.58%. The average market adjusted return in medium-term of three 
month is found as -3.20% and standard deviation of 34.81%. He concludes that the 
existence of significant abnormal positive returns of new issues on the first and fifth 
trading days is the proof of underpricing. On the contrary, on the first and third month 
after the initial trading, the IPOs are overpriced since there exist significant abnormal 
negative returns. As a result, IPOs are considered as profitable investments in the short­
term, but perform quite poorly after the first month following the initial trading.
3.2.2 Medium and Long-Term
It is also important to study the performance of IPOs in the long-run for a number of 
reasons. Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), note that in the short-run there are imperfections in 
the IPO market, such as restrictions on short selling and active price support being 
provided to new issues by the associated investment bankers. Ritter (1991), mentions that 
systematic price patterns in the long-run would raise questions concerning aftermarket 
efficiency. From the investors point of view the ability to develop trading strategies is of 
interest, and from the issuer's point of view it is the costs of going public (Aggarwal and 
Rivoli, 1991). The empirical evidence in the U.S. suggests that IPOs underperform in the 
long-run. Ibbotson (1975), reported that IPOs underperform by an average of 
approximately 1% per month in the second through fourth years. In like manner, Reilly 
(1977), found that IPOs purchased in early aftermarket trading and held for one year 
underperform market averages by 11.6% for his sample of 486 IPOs between 1972 and 
1975. However, because his analysis period is dominated by the falling 1973-1974 
market, Reilly concludes that the underperformance is due to the higher systematic risk 
of new issues. Ritter (1984), examined the aftermarket behavior of natural resource 
sector stocks. During the observation period there was a 'hot market' in this sector. He 
examined the aftermarket returns for natural resource stocks going public between 1977- 
1982. The aftermarket returns for IPOs underperformed an index of seasoned natural
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resource stocks by 15%. In addition, in his study done in 1991, Ritter found that the 
average three year holding period returns to be 34.47% after going public compared to 
61.86% for a sample of matched firms and suggests that the IPO market may be subject 
to fads. Similarly, Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), reported market adjusted returns of - 
13.73% after 250 trading days for a sample of 1598 IPOs during the period 1977-1987. 
Underperformance was also evident in aggregate in various cross-sectional groupings 
based on size of issue, offering price, year of issue, and underwriter class. In Australia, 
Finn and Higham (1988), computed the mean compound return equivalent to a buy and 
hold strategy of buying new issues at the closing price of the listing month and holding 
through to the end of month 12. This strategy showed a mean return of -6.52% with a t- 
statistic of -1.87 which was not found significant. Levis (1993), in his examination of 
British IPOs, found a long-run performance of -30.6% in three years following the first 
day of trading. He then came out with a number of conclusions. First, poor aftermarket 
performance is said to be a persistent feature of IPOs in U.K. Second, results suggest that 
the long-run underperformance extends beyond 36 months. Third, there is an apparent 
tendency for the firms with the highest initial returns to have worst aftermarket 
performance. He concludes that the emerging evidence is more consistent with the 
proposition that while a certain level of first day returns is the result of deliberate 
underpricing, marked deviations from this baseline level present some form of market 
overreaction. In Switzerland, the study of Kunz and Aggarwal (1994), found no 
underperformance in long-run when initial returns are considered, tiowever, if initial 
returns are excluded, then the three year returns are found as negative.
The long-run results of Asian markets showed mixed results. The percentage change in 
the average market-adjusted price from the closing price on first day to 12 months later 
was -9.3% for Hong Kong, -2.7% for Singapore, +18.2% for Malaysia. Since none of
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these results are significantly different from zero, Dawson (1987) concluded that the 
aftermarket was quite efficient.
The aftermarket performance in the Latin American countries of Brazil and Mexico 
showed significant long-run under performance. Investors who purchased the issues at 
the closing price of first trading day and held for three years received mean return of - 
47.0%, -23.7% in Brazil and Chile respectively. After a holding period of one year, 
Mexican IPOs displayed a significant underperformance by -19.6%.
To summarize, so far the international evidence consistently finds short-term excess 
returns, while the long-run performances in many countries showing negative excess 
returns. Table 2 summarizes the results of the previous studies on IPOs throughout the 
world.
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Table 2. Studies of Price Performance about IPOs in World Markets
A. Developed Markets
Country Study Period Sample
Size
Short-run performance (%)^ Long-run performance (%)^
1. day 1. week 1. month 1. year 2. year 3. year 4. year 5. year
Australia Finn & Higham 1966-1978 93 29.20* 0.80 -11.60*
Canada Jog & Riding 1971-1983 100 11.00* 10.50*
France Jenkinson & Mayer 1986-1987 l l ' > 25.05
France Husson & Jacquiliat 1983-1986 131 4.00*
France McDonald & 
Jacquiliat
1968-1971 31 3.03* 4.22* 4.64* 15.60*
Germany Uhlir 1977-1987 97 21.50* -7.40
Japan Dawson & Hiraki 1979-1984 106 51.90*
Netherlands Wessels 1982-1987 46 5.10
Switzerland Kunz & Aggarwal 1983-1989 42 35.8* 6.70 1.80 -6.10
UK Levis 1980-1988 712 14.30* 14.75* -30.59*
UK Jenkinson & Mayer 1979-1987 20’’ 22.20 20.85
USA McDonald & Fisher 1969-1970 142 28.5* -18.10*
USA Ibbotson 1960-1969 128 11.40* 2.40' 0.40' 0.40' 0.40' 0.70'
USA Ritter 1975-1984 1526 14.32* 0.38 -10.23* -16.89 -29.13*
USA Aggarwal & Rivoli 1977-1987 1598 10.67* -13.73*
USA
 ^T r i t i u m f l
Reilly
0 n f ‘r i r \ 7 “0  oc·  CM r m  1 r i /->o T r >
1972-1975 486 10.90* 1.50 -11.6*
a All results other than initial returns are exclusive of initial returns, and are adjusted for market movements. 
b These results are only for firms involved in privatisation programs, 
c The returns include the initial returns.
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B. Newly Industrialized and Developing Countries
Country Study Period Sample
Size
Short-run performance (%)^ Long-run performance (%)^
1. day l.week 1. month l.year 2.year 3.year 4. year 5.year
Hong Kong Dawson 1978-1983 21 13.80 -1.90 -1.00 -9.3
Korea Kim & Lee 1984-1986 41 37.00
Korea Krinsky', Kim & Lee 1985-1990 275 79.00*
Malaysia Dawson 1978-1983 21 166.70* 3.90 6.20* 18.2
Singapore Dawson 1978-1983 39 39.40 0.00 0.60 -2.7
Singapore Koh & Walter 1973-1987 66 27.20*
Finland Keloharju 1984-1989 80 8.70 -9.80 -22.90* -26.40*
Brazil Aggarwal, Leal & 
Hernandez
1980-1990 62 78.5* 2.30 -9.00 -34.90* -47.00*
Chile Aggarwal, Leal & 
Hernandez
1982-1990 19 16.30 5.60 1.10 -2.00 -23.70
Mexico
♦ U.r
Aggarwal, Leal & 
Hernandez
1987-1990 44 2.80 21.60 -19.60
â All results otHer thun initial returns are exclusive of initial returns, and are adjusted for market movements, 
b These results are only for firms involved in privatisation programs.
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4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
4.1 Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to examine both the initial and aftermarket performance 
of IPOs to test for departures from market efficiency in Turkish Stock Market. If any 
inefficiencies are uncovered in the aftermarket, investors can make arbitrage profits.
The sample of new issues are selected from underwritten offerings that are initially 
offered to public which are registered to the Capital Market Board during the period 
.Tanuary 1990-October 1993. The sample of IPOs are taken from the ISE sources. The 
sample consists of 64 IPOs out of the 87 IPOs issued in this period. The rest were not 
considered because of two reasons: either the stock was in the regional market or the 
data on the stocks were insufficient or incorrect.
There are mainly two objectives of the study:
i. to measure the short-run performance which consists of the initial return (l.day), 
second, third, fourth, fifth trading day return (1. week), second week return, third 
week return, first month return, second month return, and third month return.
ii. to measure the aftermarket performance subsequent to listing, where six month 
return and one year return are observed.
The returns are calculated from daily data which is adjusted for capital increases and 
dividends. Istanbul Stock Market Index (ISEI) is chosen to be the benchmark of the 
study. The returns are defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the closing price 
of day t to the closing price of the previous day t-1, less the equivalent change in the
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appropriate benchmark (ISEI). The first day adjusted return is defined as the 
logarithm of the percentage change in price from the offering date to the close at the 
first day of trading less the equivalent change in the appropriate benchmark which is 
the Istanbul Stock Exchange Index (ISEI).
4.2 Assumptions of the Study
We assume that daily returns of selected IPOs follow a normal distribution in the 
whole population. In addition, the volume of the offering is not taken into 
consideration. As a result, volume effect on the performance is neglected.
4.3 Time Period of the Study
The sample of 64 IPOs out of 87 IPOs issued in the continuous .lanuary 1990- 
December 1993 are taken for the analysis. IPOs for which continues price data are 
not available are excluded from the sample. 22 out of 35 IPOs in 1990, 20 out of 23 
IPOs in 1991, 10 out of 13 IPOs in 1992 and 12 out of 16 IPOs in 1993 are used for 
the study. Short-run performances are analyzed considering the first, second, third, 
fourth, fifth trading days; second, third, fourth weeks and second, third months after 
the firms are listed in the Istanbul Stock Exchange. Medium and long-term 
performances are examined in six months and one year following the listing.
4-4 Data of the Study
This study investigates the aftermarket performance of 64 firms in total. Stocks issued 
between 1990-93 can be grouped into 17 groups when the operating industries are 
taken into consideration. 9 of the companies are in the industry of glass, cement and 
ceramic. There are 7 companies in each of the following industries: 1) chemical, 
petroleum, rubber and plastic products production, 2) textile and leather, 3) metal
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work, machine and equipment fabrication, 4) banking. In addition, 5 firms are
functioning in each of the industry of paper, paper products, printing and 
publication; and financial institutions like holdings and investment firms. There are 
4 firms in leasing and factoring firms category as well. Furthermore, in each of the 
four categories: primary metal industry; sector of electric, gas and water; restaurants 
and hotels; and insurance firms, 2 IPOs from the sample are covered. Moreover, only 
one firm from the groups: food industry, wood work industry, retail trading, 
wholesale trading are included in the sample.
IPOs in the sample were either sold as offers for sale at a fixed price or tender. The 
volume of the offerings in the sample for 1990-93 period adds up to 
5,282,281,560,000 TL (Appendix 1.). In 1990, total number of shares issued for the 
22 IPOs were 433, 899,014 producing 2,476,863,265,000 TL. In 1991, a visible 
decline in both the number of shares issued and the total proceed is seen as 
99,979,790 shares and 844,512,220,000 TL. respectively. Subsequently in 1992, 
90,930,975 shares supplied proceeds of 508,906,075,000 TL. Lastly in 1993, 
proceeds were 1,452,000,000,000 TL with 183,450,000 shares.
4.5 Methodology of the Study
Numerous studies were done throughout the world that examined the initial and 
aftermarket performance of IPOs and tried to solve the underpricing puzzle. The 
market model used by: McDonald-Fisher (1972), Ritter (1991), Levis (1993), 
Aggarwal-Leal-Hemandez (1993), Peavy (1990) is chosen to be applied for the 
computation of short- and long-mn price performances.
Adjusting the security prices for market wide movements on individual stock returns 
is said to be a general problem that take considerable attention. Estimating the 
parameters of Sharpe-Linter-Mossin capital asset pricing model for each security and
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interpreting the residual in each period, arjt, as an abnormal return of stock j, is a 
useful procedure.
"" ccj + Pj Rmt + arjt ( 1 )
In this study, the transformation of stock returns to excess returns in equation (2) 
serves to adjust roughly for market effects on IPO returns to investors.
arjt “  Kjt - Rmt (2)
where, Rjt is the return on stock j in day t, and Rmt is the return on the benchmark in 
the same period.
Rjt= In (Pj,t/Pj,t-1) (3)
where, Pj,t is adjusted closing price of stock j on day t
Pj,t-l is adjusted closing price of stock j on day t-1
The return on the benchmark Rm,t is defined in a similar fashion as the natural 
logarithm of the percentage change in ISE composite index .
Rmt = In (Pm,t / Pm,t-l) (4)
where, Pm,t is the closing price of ISEI on day t
Pm,t-1 is the closing price of ISEI on day t-1
Then, the average benchmark adjusted return on a portfolio of n stocks for event day t 
is the equally-weighted arithmetic average of the benchmark adjusted retiu'ns:
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ARt = arji) / n
j=l
(5)
The cumulative benchmark adjusted aftermarket performance from the beginning of 
the first day of trading to day s is the summation of the average benchmark adjusted 
returns from the first day of trading to day s:
CARi,s = ^A R t (6)
t=l
Hypothesis Testing
The hypothesis that, "Investors obtain initial positive abnormal returns relative to the 
market because of underpricing issue. In long-term, however, they encounter 
underperformance with respect to the market." will be tested by the examination of 
price changes with respect to the return of the ISEI.
Short term; Ho: no positive abnormal returns exist in short term relative to the
market
Ha: there exist positive abnormal returns in short term relative to
the market
Long term: Ho: no underperformance of IPOs exist in long term
Ha; IPOs underperform in long term
The significance of the results will be tested by using t-test. Aftermarket 
performances of the sample IPOs are being observed for 1 year (255 trading days) m 
order to compare results with the international studies.
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Hypothesis is tested by the natural logarithm of percentage price changes of sample 
IPOs which were adjusted for capital increases (to have a reliable set of returns for 
the studied period).
For the null hypothesis to be tested that the mean day t abnormal return is smaller or 
equal to zero, we compute t-statistic as:
t = ARi / a  (ARt) (7)
where a (ARt) is the standard deviation of the sample mean on day t.
To test whether the cumulative abnormal return from day tl until day t2 is 
significantly positive, we compute the statistical significance of CAR by t-test:
t = CAR / ct(CAR)
CT (CAR) = a  (ARt)*(t2-tl+l)l^2
(8)
(8.1)
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5. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
We will examine return performances in two sections: short-term and medium-long- 
term. The returns of first, second, third, fourth and fifth (1 week) trading days 
followed by second, third and fourth weeks and second and third months are reported 
in the short-term price performance section. The medium- and long-term include the 
sixth month and one year returns from the offering date. The data is composed of 22 
IPOs out of 35 in 1990, 20 IPOs out of 23 in 1991,10 IPOs out of 13 in 1992 and 12 
IPOs out of 16 in 1993. The rest of the IPOs was not analyzed because of the data 
unavailability. The average returns, the cumulative average returns and the 
corresponding t-statistics of this study for the years 1990-1993 are given in tabular 
form. The following tables contain the results both for the short-term and for the 
medium- and long-term price performances.
Table 3. Performance of IPOs in 1990-1993 (N=64)
TIME ARt (%) t-statistic (ARt) CARt (%) t-statistic (CARt)
Day 1 4.406 3.276* 4.406 3.276^
Day 2 3.956 2.606* 8.362 3.894*
Day 3 1.149 1.635 9.510 7.819*
Day 4 0.569 0.709 10.079 6.276*
Day 5 -0.537 -0.774 9.542 6.146*
Week 2 0.341 0.617 11.761 6.733*
Weeks 0.028 0.055 13.120 6.608*
Week 4 0.099 0.122 13.001 3.569*
Moiitli 2 -0.242 -0.456 10.836 3.226*
Month 3 0.573 0.983 9.048 1.927*
Month 6 0.208 0.333 1.423 0.204
Year 1 -0.388 -0.900 -8.808 -1.278
Significant at 0.05 significance level and 63 degiees of freedom (t critical = 1.645)
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Table 4. Performance o f  IPOs in 1990 (N=22)
TIME ARt (%) t-statistic (ARt) CARt (%) t-statistic (CARt)
Day 1 1.953 1.194 1.953 1.194
Day 2 1.956 2.219* 3.909 3.135*
Day 3 0.820 1.034 4.729 3.444*
Day 4 -0.046 -0.033 4.683 1.657
Day 5 0.102 0.099 4.783 2.068*
Week 2 0.479 0.516 3.010 1.026
Weeks 0.555 0.702 2.513 0.820
Week 4 0.915 0.464 A.125 0.536
Month 2 -1.508 -2.197 4.031 0.929
Month 3 0.512 0.643 1.102 0.172
Month 6 0.875 0.877 6.217 0.557
Year I -0.432 -0.462 -6.42! -0.41!
 ^ Significant at 0.05 significance level and 21 degrees of freedom (t critical -- 1.721)
Table 5. Performance of IPOs in 1991 (N=20)
TIME ARt (%) t-statistic (ARt) CARt (%) t-statistic (CARt)
Day I 4.025 1.463 4.025 1.463
Day 2 5.509 1.203 9.534 1.471
Day 3 -0.370 -0.258 9.168 3.731*
Day 4 -0.060 -0.040 9.110 3.163*
Day 5 -3.200 -2.491 5.909 2.058*
Week 2 -1.096 -1.225 2.829 1.083
Weeks 0.984 1.432 2.661 1.451
Week 4 0.580 0.518 3.855 0.770
Month 2 0.724 0.762 4.738 0.789
Month 3 0.579 0.606 2.970 0,383
Month 6 0.798 0.610 -5.210 -0.357
Year I -0.608 -0.906 -5.320 -0.496
* Significant at 0.05 significance level and 19 degrees of freedom (t critical = 1.729)
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Table 6. Performance o f  IPOs in 1992 (N=10)
TIME ARt (%) t-statistic (ARt) CARt (%) t-statistic (CARt)
Day 1 5.343 2.897* 5.343 2.897*
Day 2 0.242 0.149 5.586 2.434*
Day 3 -0.401 -0.213 5.184 1.590
Day 4 -1.305 -0.789 3.879 1.185
Day 5 0.168 0.790 4.647 2.138*
Week 2 -0.220 -0.100 4.443 0.715
Week 3 0.141 0.073 1.(511 1.017
Week 4 -0.458 -0.526 5.471 1.407
Month 2 0.661 0.439 -1.110 -0.119
Month 3 -1.895 -1.866 -4.081 -0.489
Month 6 -1.645 -1.367 -11.470 -0.860
Year 1 -2.783 -1.907* ■ -32.262 -L 390
‘ Significant at 0.05 significance level and 9 degrees of freedom (t erilieal = 1.833)
Table 7. Performance of IPOs in 1993 (N=12)
TIME ARt (%) t-statistic (ARt) CARt (%) t-statistic (CARt)
Day 1 8.756 2.009* 8.756 2.009*
Day 2 8.128 6.002* 16.884 8.815*
Day 3 5.567 3.631* 22.452 8.453*
Day 4 4.305 2.385* 26.156 7.442*
Day 5 1.640 0.833 28.396 6.450*
Week 2 2.427 1.901* 47.780 11.836*
Week3 -0.272 -1.894 51.880 9.310*
Week 4 -1.733 -1.211 49.690 7.761*
Month 2 0.115 0.060 44.540 3.686*
Month 3 -0.328 -0.175 47.510 3.141*
Month 6 -2.354 -3.037* 14.360 1.658
Year I -0.006 -0.006 0.070 0.005
* Sigiiificaiil at 0.05 significance level and 11 degrees of ficedom (t critical -  1.796)
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5.1 Short-Term Results
As the whole 1990-1993 period is considered, it is seen that 49 out of 64 IPOs 
produced positive returns in the first day of trading whereas 15 showed negative 
performances when compared with the return of market index. In this whole period, 
Facto Finans Factoring had the highest return of 44.37% and Esbank had the lowest 
return o f -21.79%. The average market adjusted return on the first trading day was 
4.406% with a t-ratio of 3.276 which is found to be significant at 0.05 significance 
level. The critical t-ratio for one sided test at 0,05 significance level and 63 degrees of 
freedom is 1.645. Second day after the trading also showed high significant returns 
with an average adjusted return (AR2) of 3.956% and a t-statistic of 2.606. Third day's 
ARj was 1.149% and the corresponding t-ratio was 1.635. After the third day, the 
ARt decreased under 1% level being 0.569%, -0.537% for the fourth and fifth trading 
days, but the cumulative average return (CARt) were 10.079% and 9.542% with t- 
statistics of 6.276 and 6.146 respectively. At the end of second week, CAR found to 
be 11.761% with a t-ratio of 6.733. In the third week the CAR was 13.120, having a 
t-ratio of 6.608. CAR appears to be 13.001% in the fourth week obtaining a t-statistic 
of 3.569. Second month, CAR was 10.836% and the corresponding t-ratio being 
3.266. Positive CAR still continue in the third month with 9.048% and still 
significant. To summarize, in the first two days of trading IPO market exercise high 
and significant positive average returns. Although the average returns drop down to 
insignificant levels afterwards, the significance of cumulative average returns 
continue up to the end of month 3.
If we investigate the results year by year; in 1990, it is found that 18 IPOs out of 22 
showed positive excess returns in the first day of trading and only 4 IPOs indicated 
negative returns. The average adjusted first day return come out to be 1.953% with a 
t-ratio of 1.194 which is not significant at 0.05 significance level, critical t-value 
being 1.721 for 21 degrees of freedom and 0.05 level. Second day performance
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showed nearly similar AR with 1.956% which was now significant. Average adjusted 
return in the third day was 0.820% followed by a negative return in the fourth day 
with -0.046%. The CARs for weeks one, two, three and four were 4.785%, 3.010%, 
2.513%, 4.725% respectively which were all insignificant. The second and third 
month results showed a decreasing trend with CAR of 4.031% and 1.102% which 
were not significant at 0.05 level either.
For the analysis of 20 IPOs issued in 1991, 14 of them exercised positive returns in 
the first day of trading and the average adjusted first day return appeared to be 
4.025% with an associated t statistic of 1.463. The first day return was not significant 
because the critical t-value for 19 degrees of freedom and 0.05 significance level was 
1.729. Second, third, fourth and fifth day average returns are in a decreasing trend 
being 5.509%, -0.37%, -0.06%, -3.2% respectively. Second week after the first 
trading, CAR was found to be 2.829% which is not significant. Third and fourth week 
cumulative average returns were 2.661% and 3.855%. After the second month with a 
CAR of 4.738%, returns display a decreasing trend, being 2.970% in month 3 and 
negative values in medium- and long-term.
In 1992, 9 out of 10 IPOs led positive excess returns in the first day of trading. The 
average first day return was 5.343% that is significant with a t-ratio of 2.897. The 
critical t-value is 1.833 for 9 degrees of freedom and 0.05 level of significance. The 
aftermarket adjusts rapidly having a second day average return of 0.242% with a t- 
ratio of 0.149. The cumulative average returns for third, fourth, fifth days are, 
5.184%, 3.879%, 4.647% respectively. Similarly, CARs for weeks two, three and 
four are calculated as, 4.443%, 7.027%, and 5.471% in the order. Later, in the second 
and third months, the CAR falls to negative values o f -1.11% and -4.081% although 
they are insignificant.
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It is observed that in 1993, 8 out of 12 IPOs issued in this year, showed positive 
returns. The first day average return is 8.756% with an associated t-statistic of 2.009, 
which is significant at 0.05 level of significance and 11 degrees of freedom that 
necessitate a critical t-statistic of 1.796. The second, third, and fourth day returns are 
8.128%, 5.567% and 4.305% respectively. The corresponding t-statistics are equal to 
6.002, 3.631 and 2.385. The first weekly return of 12 IPOs averaged to 28.396% with 
a corresponding t-statistic of 6.450. The significant cumulative returns continue in the 
second, third and fourth weeks performing 47.78%, 51.88% and 49.69%. After then, 
returns show a small decline reaching a 44.54% return in cumulative for the second 
month. The third month returns from the offering perform a 47.51% positive return 
with a t-ratio of 3.141.
5.2 Medium and Long-Term Results
When we consider medium-term as 6 weeks after the offering, through the period of 
1990-1993, the cumulative return for this period is found to be 1.423% with a t- 
statistic of 0.204; and in the long-term which is considered as one year, the CAR is 
calculated as -8.808% including the initial return. The corresponding t-statistics was - 
1.278 which is not significant at 0.05 level of significance.
As the medium- and long-term performances are observed according to year of 
issuance of IPOs, we are confronted with the following results in the aftermarket. In
1990, the medium-term cumulative average return was found as 6.217% with a t-ratio 
of 0.557. The long-term result however was negative, -6.421%, being insignificant. In
1991, cumulative average return for the first six months was, -5.210%, and for one 
year the corresponding CAR was -5.320%. For the year 1992, 10 IPOs produced 
a negative CAR of -11.47% in six months, and -32.262% in one year period. The 
highest medium and long-term cumulative average returns are observed in 1993. The
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may cause the sample being nonrepresentative. Furthermore, in order to measure IPO 
performance relative to outstanding stocks in the market, Istanbul Stock Exchange 
Index is assumed to be representative of the stock market. But it is not very 
meaningful for an investor to have a portfolio covering all the stocks that are present 
in the index. In addition, the model used assumes that the non-diversifiable risk of 
each new issue of Turkish Stocks for the period 1990-1993, is the same as that of the 
ISEI average. However, inter-firm differences in Pj are found to exist in the studies 
done world wide among recent offerings, and that the average Pj of new issues 
exceeds one according to these studies, that means most new issues are riskier than 
the benchmark. In order to say an exact word about the riskiness of the sample of 
firms, one has to find Pj for each stock in the sample and compare it with the riskiness 
of ISEI average. This may create a necessity for another study which will take the 
riskiness of the sample into consideration.
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6. CONCLUSION
The study examined the short and long term price performance of initial public 
offerings. It is hypothesized that, in short term the newly issued stocks will show 
abnormal return relative to the market and in long term, they will underperform with 
respect to the market.
Although the short terra results fall in line with the international evidence, the 
medium and long term results did not support the alternative hypothesis. The initial 
abnormal return of sample IPOs relative to ISEI was statistically significant, which 
supports the idea that investors can experience high abnormal returns in short term. 
On the other hand, market adjusts after the third day that an investor who buys the 
issue at the first day of aftermarket and hold for two days do not get the abnormal 
return. In medium term of 6 weeks, a positive cumulative average return of 1.423% is 
realized but it is not significant. Lastly, in long run, a negative cumulative average 
return of -8.808% is exercised; however, the second hypothesis related to long
term was insignificant stating that IPOs do not under perform relative to the market 
index.
As a conclusion, we can say the IPO market is inefficient which gives significant 
opportunity for abnormal returns. It can be easily observed from the results that, 
Turkish IPO market cannot rapidly adjust the prices of new shares to reflect the 
available information. The adjustment takes place after a long time interval of three 
months. But we should not disregard the limitations of this study as: the sample size 
being very limited, representativeness of the samples to the IPO population, the 
period being examined.
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This inefficiency might be because of the low information usage on the part of 
investors. ISE is relatively a new market which is in its early stages of development; 
besides public offerings are a more recent phenomena in the market. Furthermore, the 
financial tables do not reflect much information. Price manipulation in the 
aftermarket and uncertainity in the economic environment of Turkey might be 
responsible for the inefficiency.
In this study, Istanbul Stock Exchange Index (ISEI) is used as a benchmark. It is 
advised to use the same model by some other benchmarks, as the results are veiy 
much dependent on the selection of benchmark. Further study with a larger sample 
size and consideration of different benchmarks may be helpful for better investigation 
of IPO market. In addition, segmentation according to risk class, issuer type, size, 
industry and price group, underwriter type and reputation, choice of offering method 
may help to solve the underpricing puzzle.
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APPENDIX АЛ. IPOs IN 1990
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APPENDIX A.2. IPOs IN 1991
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APPENDIX A.3. IPOs IN 1992
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APPENDIX A.4. IPOs IN 1993
NAME OF THE COMPANY PRICE (TL) IPODATE FIRST TRADING 
DATE
NUMBER OF 
SHARES
AMOUNT SOLD 
(*1000 TL)
LTsDERWRITER NAME
1. EGE se r a m ik 6750 9/2/93 15/2/93 9,000,000 60,750,000 FINANSBANK, ISBANK, 
TSKB. YATIRIM FINAX2· InETAS e l e k  1 RlK 8250 11/3/93 15/3/93 25,200,000 207,900,000 IS BANKASI3- AKTAS ELEKTRIK 6000 27/5/93 7/6/93 3,000,000 18,000,000 KORFEZBANK4. DOĞAN HOLDING 5200 14/6/93 21/6/93 19,500,000 101,400,000 TEB, IS BANKASI5. KONITEKS KONFEKS. 2750 21/6/93 3/8/93 1,500,000 4,125,000 IS BANKASI6. RAKS ELEKTRONIK 3900 20/7/93 9/8/93 22,000,000 85,800,000 KORFEZBANK, 
GLOBAL, EGEBANK7. m il l iy e t  GAZETE 25500 20/9/93 27/9/93 12,000,000 306,000,000 TEB, IS BANKASI8. FIN ANS LEASING 4500 28/9/93 5/10/93 28,000,000 126,000,000 FINANSBANK,KORFEZ 
EGEBANK, g a r a n t i9. FACTOFINANS 7000 11/10/93 25/10/93 . 4,500,000 31,500,000 ik tisat  BANKASI10. ANADOLU SİGORTA 11500 11/10/93 25/10/93 18,750,000 215,625,000 IS BANKASI11. AKSU iplik 7500 1/11/93 15/11/93 30,000,000 225,000,000 IS BANKASI, TSKB12. AKTİF FIN'ANS FACT. 7000 29/11/93 20/12/93 10,000,000 70,000,000 VAKIF M.K.,TEKSTIL 
B. FINANSBANK
TOTAL 183,450,000 1,452, 100,000
44
REFERENCES
1- Aggarwal, R. ,Leal, R. and Hernandez, F, "The Aftermarket Performance of 
Initial Public Offerings in Latin America", Financial Management, Spring 1993, 
pp. 42-53.
2. Aggarwal, R., and Rivoli, P., “Fads in the Initial Public Offerings Market”, 
Financial Management, Vol. 14, Winter 1990, pp. 45-56.
3. Baron, D. P., “ A Model of the Demand for investment Banking Advising and 
Distribution Services for New Issues”, Journal of Finance, September 1982, pp. 
955-976.
4. Beatty, R. P., and Ritter, J. R., “Investment Banking Reputation and the 
Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 
15, 1986, pp. 213-232.
5. Block, S. and Stanley, M., "The Financial Characteristics and Price Movement 
Patterns of Companies Approaching the Unseasoned Securities Market in the Late
1970s", Financial Management, Winter 1980, pp. 30-36.
6. Capital Markets Board, December, 1995, pp. 4.
7. Chalk, A. .1. and Peavy, J. W., "Initial Public Offerings: Daily Returns, Offering 
Types and the Price Effect", Financial Analysts Journal, Sept/Oct 1987, pp. 65- 
69.
8. Dawson, S. M., “ Secondary Stock Market Performance of Initial Public 
Offerings, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia: 1978-1984”, Journal of Business 
and Finance and Accounting, Spring 1987, pp. 65-76.
9. Dawson, S. M., and Hiraki, T., "Selling Unseasoned New Shoes in Hong Kong 
and .Tapan: A Test of Primary Market Efficiency and Underpricing", Hong Kong 
Journal of Business Management, 1985.
10. Finn, F. K., and Higham, R., “The Performance of Unseasoned New Equity 
Issues-Cum-Stock Exchange Listing in Australia”, Journal of Banking and 
Finance, Vol. 12, 1988, pp. 333-351.
45
11. Hanley, K. W., “The Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings and the Partial 
Adjustment Phenomenon”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 34, 1993, pp. 
231-250.
12. Plusson, B. and Jacquillat B. C., "Sous-évaluation des Titres et Méthodes 
d’introduction au Second Marché (1983-1986)", Revue Finance 11, 1990, pp.l23- 
134.
13. Ibbotson, R. G., "Price Performance of Common Stock New Issues", Journal of 
Financial Economies, September 1975, pp. 22>5-TJ2.
14. Ibbotson, R. G., Sindelar, J. L., and Ritter, J. R., "Initial and Public Offerings", 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1988.
15. Ibbotson, R. G., Sindelar, J. L., and Ritter, J. R., "The Market's Problems with the 
Problems of Initial Public Offerings", Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,
1994, pp. 66-74.
16. Jenkinson, T., and Mayer, C., “Privatization Process in France and the UK”, 
European Economic Review, Vol. 32, 1988, pp. 482-490.
17. .log, V. M., and Riding, A. L., “Underpricing in Canadian Initial Public 
Offerings”, Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 43, November- December 1987, pp. 
48-54.
18. Keely, M., "Raising Equity - The Problem of Setting Issue Price, in M. Firth and 
S.M. Keane editions, 1986.
19. Keloharju, M., "The Winner's Curse, Legal Liability, and The Long-Run Price 
Performance of Initial Public Offerings in Finland" Journal of Financial 
Economics, 1993(34), pp. 251-277.
20. Kim, E. H., and Lee, Y. K., “Issuing Stocks in Korea”, in Pacific Basin Capital 
Markets Research, 1990, pp. 243-253.
21. Koh, F., and Walter, T., “A Direct Test of Rock’s Model of the Pricing of 
Unseasoned Issues”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 23, 1989, pp. 251-272.
22. Krinsky, 1., Kim, J. B., and Lee, J., “ Motives for Going Public and 
Underpricing”, Working Paper, McMaster University, 1992.
46
23. Kunz, R. M., and Aggarwal, R., “Why Initial Public Offerings are Underpriced; 
Evidence from Switzerland”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 18, 1994, pp. 
705-723.
24. Levis, M., "The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings: The UK 
Experience 1980-1988", Financial Management, Spring 1993, pp. 28-41.
25. Logue, D. E., “On the Pricing of Unseasoned Equity Offerings; 1965-69”, Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 8, 1973, pp. 91-103.
26. Loughran, T., “NYSE vs. NASDAQ returns”. Journal of Financial Economics, 
Vol. 33, 1993, pp. 241-260.
27. McDonald, J. G., and Jacquillat, B. C., “Pricing of Initial Equity Issues: The 
French Sealed-Bid Auction”, The Journal of Business, Vol. 47, 1974, pp. 36-48.
28. McDonald, .1. G. and Fisher, A. K., "New Issue Stock Price Behavior", Journal of 
Finance, March 1972, pp. 97-102.
29. Miller, R. E., and Reilly, F. K., “An Examination of Mispricing, Returns, and 
Uneertainty for Initial Public Offerings”, Financial Management, Vol. 16, 
Summer 1987, pp. 33-38.
30. Neuberger, B. M. and La Chapelle, C. A., "Unseasoned New Issue Price 
Performance of Three Tiers: 1975-1980", Financial Management, Vol. 12, 
Autumn 1983, pp. 23-28.
31. Neuberger, B. M. and Hammond, C. T., "A Study of Underwriters' Experience 
with Unseasoned New Issues", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysid', 
March 1974, pp. 165-180.
32. Oztop, H. I., "Price Performance of Initial Public Offerings in Istanbul Stock 
Exchange", MBA Thesis, Bilkent University, July 1996, pp. 17-18.
33. Peavy, J. W., “Returns on Initial Public Offerings of Closed-End Funds”, The 
Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1990, pp. 695-708.
34. Reilly, F. K., “New Issues Revisited”, Financial Management, Vol. 6, 1977, pp. 
28-42.
47
35. Ritter, J. R., “The Hot Issue Market of 1980”, Journal of Business, Vol. 57, No. 2, 
1984, pp. 215-240.
36. Ritter, ,T. R., "The Long -Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings", Journal of 
Finance, March 1991, pp. 3-27.
37. Rock, K., "Why New Issues Are Underpriced", Journal of Financial Economics, 
March 1986, pp. 187-212.
38. Ruud, .1. S., “Underwriter Price Support and the IPO Underpricing Puzzle”, 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 34, 1993, pp. 135-151.
39. Slovin, M. B., Sushka, M. E., and Bendeck, Y. M., “Seasoned Common Stock 
Issuance Following an IPO”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 18, 1994, pp. 
207-226.
40. Smith, C. W., “investment Banking and the Capital Acquisition Process”, Journal 
of Financial Economics, Vol. 15, 1986, pp. 3-29.
41. Spiess, D. K., and Graves, J. A., “ Underperforraance in Long-Run Stock Returns 
Following Seasoned Equity Offerings”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 38, 
1995, pp. 243- 267.
42. Tini9, S. M., “Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock”, .lournal of 
Finance, Vol. 46, 1988, pp. 3-27.
43. Uhlir, tl., “Going Public in the F.R.G.”, in Reappraisal of the Efficiency of 
Financial Markets, R. Guimaraes, et al (eds.), 1989.
44. Wessels, R. E., “The Market for Initial Public Offerings: An Analysis of the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange”, in A Reappraisal of the Efficiency of Financial 
Markets, R. Guimaraes, et al (eds.), 1989.
48
